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What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic ￿nancial market
where traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a
standard sequential trading model to allow for career concerns. We
show that the market must be informationally ineﬃcient: there is no
equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even in the long
run. This ￿nding, which stands in sharp contrast with the results for
standard ￿nancial markets, is due to the fact that our traders face
an endogenous incentive to behave in a conformist manner. We also
show that each asset carries an endogenous reputational bene￿to r
cost, which, if asset supply is suﬃciently limited, translates into a
price premium or discount and can generate bubbles.
1 Introduction
The substantial increase in the institutional ownership of corporate equity
around the world in recent decades has underscored the importance of study-
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1ing the eﬀects of institutional trade on asset prices.1 Institutions, and their
employees, may be guided by incentives not fully captured by standard mod-
els in ￿nance. For example, consider the case of US mutual funds which
make up a signi￿cant proportion of institutional investors in US equity mar-
kets. An important body of empirical work highlights the fact that mutual
funds (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison [12]) and their employees (Chevalier and
Ellison [13]) both face career concerns: they are interested in enhancing their
reputation with their respective principals and sometimes indulge in perverse
actions (e.g. excessive risk taking) in order to achieve this. Given the im-
portance of institutions in equity markets, it is plausible to expect that such
behaviour may aﬀect equilibrium quantities in ￿nancial markets. What are
the equilibrium features of a market in which a large proportion of traders
face reputational concerns?
While a growing body of literature examines the eﬀects of agency con￿icts
on asset pricing, the explicit modeling of reputation in ￿nancial markets is
in its infancy.2 Dasgupta and Prat [15] present a two-period micro-founded
model of careern concerns in ￿nancial markets to examine the eﬀect of rep-
utation in enhancing trading volume. However, that analysis is done for a
static market: each asset is traded only once.
The present contribution is to study the equilibrium of a multi-period
￿nancial market in which some traders have reputational concerns. As we
shall see, the dynamic properties of such market are very diﬀerent from those
of a standard market.
We present the most parsimonious model that captures the essence of
our arguments. Much of our model is standard. We present a T-period
sequential trade market for a single (Arrow) asset where all transactions
occur via uninformed market makers who are risk neutral and competitive
(following Glosten and Milgrom [18] and Kyle [19]) and quote bid and ask
prices to re￿ect the informational content of order ￿ow. In addition there
is a large group of liquidity-driven noise traders who trade for exogenous
1On the New York Stock Exchange the percentage of outstanding corporate equity
held by institutional investors has increased from 7.2% in 1950 to 49.8% in 2002 (NYSE
Factbook 2003). For OECD countries as a whole, institutional ownership now accounts
for around 30% of corporate equity (Nielsen [23]). Allen [2] presents persuasive arguments
for the importance of ￿nancial institutions to asset pricing.
2Allen and Gorton [4] and Dow and Gorton [17] examine the asset pricing implications
of non-reputational agency concern. Reputational concerns are implicit in the contractual
forms assumed in the general equilibrium models Cuoco and Kaniel [14] and Vayanos [33].
2reasons that are unrelated to the liquidation value of the asset. Our only
innovation is that we introduce a large group of reputationally-concerned
institutional traders (whom we call fund managers), who trade on behalf of
other (inactive) investors. These traders receive a payoﬀ that depends both
on the direct pro￿ts they produce and on the reputation that they earn with
their clients. These fund managers can be of two types (smart or dumb)
and receive informative signals about the asset liquidation value, where the
precision depends on their (unknown) type. In each trading round either a
randomly selected fund manager or a noise trader interact with the market
maker. The asset payoﬀ is realized at time T and all payments are made.
We present the following results.
1. We show that, in this market of reputationally-sensitive traders, prices
never converge to true liquidation value, even in the long run.I ff u n d
managers trade according to their private signal, price evolves to in-
corporate such private information. Over time, price should converge
to the true liquidation value. However, as the uncertainty over the
liquidation value is resolved, two things happen. First, the fund man-
agers have less opportunity to make trading pro￿ts because price is
close to the liquidation value. The expected pro￿t for a fund manager
who trades according to his signal is always positive, but it tends to
zero as the price becomes more precise. Second, taking a ￿contrarian￿
position (e.g. selling after price has been going up) starts to carry a
reputational cost: with high probability, the trade will turn out to be
incorrect and the fund manager will ￿look dumb￿ in the eyes of (ratio-
nal) investors. Because of the combination of these two eﬀects, when
price becomes suﬃciently precise fund managers begin to behave in a
conformist way: their trade stops re￿ecting their private information.
From then on, there is no information aggregation whatsoever and the
price stays constant.
2. Having thus ruled out equilibria in which fund managers always trade
sincerely, we proceed to construct examples of equilibria with con-
formist trading. In particular, we illustrate that there may exist an
equilibrium in this model in which institutional traders trade sincerely
until prices reach a high or low threshold. Once the price crosses such
a threshold, they proceed to trade in a conformist manner.
3. We show that at any given price, there may be a diﬀerence between the
3expected total value of the asset for a regular trader and for a trader
with career concerns. We refer to this diﬀerence as the reputational
bene￿to rc o s tc a r r i e db yt h ea s s e ta tt h a tp r i c e . W es h o wt h a tt h i s
reputational bene￿t is increasing in the asset price.
4. We demonstrate that career concerns can also lead to the formation
of asset price bubbles. In the baseline model, fund managers have
all the bargaining power in transactions because traders without ca-
reer concerns are risk neutral and competitive. Hence, the asset price
only re￿ects ￿fair￿ expectations of fundamentals. Once this assump-
tion is relaxed, the reputational bene￿to rc o s td e ￿ned above aﬀects
the market price of the assets and generates a reputational premium or
discount. Price bubbles may now arise. Our theory of bubbles yields
testable predictions on the relation between the dynamics of the net
trade by career traders and asset mispricing.
5. Finally, we subject our basic model to a number of robustness checks.
The baseline model was presented under the assumption that institiu-
tional traders were unaware of their type. We illustrate that as long
as self-knowledge is not extremely accurate, our core results remain
unchanged. Also, while in the baseline model we assume that non-
pecuniary rewards depend on the individual reputation, we extend the
model to allow for rewards based on relative reputation and show that
sincere trading cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
The present paper brings together two in￿uential strands of the literature.
The ￿rst strand concerns the theory of dynamic ￿nancial markets with asym-
metrically informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom [18] and Kyle [19]). The
second strand focusses on the analysis of career concerns in sequential in-
vestment decision-making (Scharfstein and Stein [25]). Models in the ￿rst
strand consider a full-￿edged ￿nancial market with endogenously determined
prices but do not allow traders to have career concerns. Models in the second
strand do the exact opposite: they analyze the role of reputational concerns
in a partial equilibrium setting, where prices are exogenously ￿xed.
In the ￿rst strand, Glosten and Milgrom [18] have shown that in a dy-
namic ￿nancial markets the price must tend to the true liquidation value in
the long term. More recently, Avery and Zemsky [8] have shown that sta-
tistical information cascades ￿ l￿ Banerjee [9] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
4a n dW e l c h[ 1 0 ]a r ei m p o s s i b l ei ns u c ham a r k e t . 3 After every investment
decision, the price adjusts to re￿ect the expected value of the asset based
on information revealed by past trades. Thus, traders with private infor-
mation stand to make a pro￿t by trading according to their signals. But
by doing so, they release additional private information into the public do-
main. In the long run, the market achieves informational eﬃciency.4 Our
work shows that the addition of career concerns changes things dramatically.
The presence of a reputational motive can make the market informationally
ineﬃcient and can generate bubbles. Other authors (Lee [20] and Chari and
Kehoe [11]) have argued that information cascades can occur when prices
are endogenous.5 However, their arguments hinge on a market breakdown:
trade stops altogether. Instead, in our model trade continues even after the
informational cascade has started.
In the second strand, Scharfstein and Stein [25] have shown that managers
who care about their reputation for ability may choose to ignore relevant pri-
vate information and instead mimic past investment decisions of other man-
agers.6 This is because a manager who possesses ￿contrarian￿ information
(for instance he observes a negative signal for an asset that has experienced
price growth) jeopardizes his reputation if he decides to trade according to
his signal.7 From this perspective, the contribution of the present paper
3A word of caution is in order here. There is almost universal agreement in the
literature on the meaning of a cascade,w h i c hi st h ed e ￿nition we have used above (an
equilibrium event in which information gets trapped, and agents￿ actions no longer reveal
any of their valuable private information). However, there is little agreement on the
de￿nition of the term herds (for example, substantively diﬀerent de￿nitions are used by
Avery and Zemsky ([8]), Smith and Sorensen ([30]), and Chari and Kehoe ([11])). In the
interest of clarity, throughout this paper we shall restrict attention to cascades only.O n
occasion, we shall make a distinction between eﬃcient and ineﬃcient cascades.
4Under additional assumptions, Avery and Zemsky [8] show that a form of herd be-
haviour may occur in the presence of prices, but in all versions of their model cascades are
absent and prices always converge to true liquidation value.
5In Lee￿s [20] model the existence of a transaction cost to trading can prevent traders
with relatively inaccurate signals from trading, thus trapping private information in an
illiquid market. In Chari and Kehoe [11], traders have the option of exiting the market
(by making an outside investment) and may in equilibrium ￿nd it optimal to exit before
further information arrives, thus, again, trapping private information.
6Other more recent papers in this strand include, for example, Avery and Chevalier [7]
and Trueman [32].
7The partial equilibrium reputational model that is closest to ours is Ottaviani and
Sorensen [24]. The connection will be discussed in detail in Section 3.
5is to embed Scharfstein and Stein￿s model model into a standard dynamic
market model such as Glosten and Milgrom [18]. This allows us to show
that Scharfstein and Stein ￿ si n s i g h t so nc o n f o r m i s t i cb e h a v i o ra r er o b u s tt o
the extension to market equilibrium. But more importantly, we are able to
study the implications of micro-founded reputation-driven conformism over
market behavior (prices, informational eﬃciency, trades, and pro￿ts), which
opens the way to potentially interesting predictions on observable market
variables.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
present the model. Section 3 discusses the impossibility of full information
aggregation, ￿rst through an example and then through the general result.
Section 4 provides an example of an equilibrim price dynamics, while sec-
tion 5 studies the dynamics of the reputational bene￿to rc o s to ft h ea s s e t .
Section 6 shows that, if asset supply is limited, the price can incorporate a
reputational premium and bubbles can arise. Extensions are examined in
section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2M o d e l
The economy lasts T discrete periods: 1,2,...T. Trade can occur in periods
1,2...T − 1. The market trades an Arrow security, which has liquidation
value v ∈ {0,1}, which is revealed at time T.
There are a large number of fund managers and noise traders. At each
period t ∈ {1,2,...,T − 1} either a fund manager or a noise trade enters
the market with probabilities 1 − δ and δ ∈ (0,1) respectively. The traders
interact with a risk-neutral competitive market maker, and can issue market
orders (at)t ob u y( at =1 )one unit or sell (at =0 ) one unit of the asset.
The market maker sets ask (pa
t) and bid (pb
t) prices equal to expected value
of v conditional on order history. Denote the history of observed orders at
the beginning of period t (not including the order at time t) by ht.L e t
pt = E(v|ht), pa
t = E(v|ht,buy), pb
t = E(v|ht,sell).
The fund manager can be of two types: θ ∈ {b,g} with Pr(θ = g)=γ.
T h et y p ei si n d e p e n d e n to fv.I f a t t i m e t a fund manager appears, he
8There is a growing body of empirical literature on conformist behaviour by institu-
tional traders. Sias ([29]) surveys this literature, reconciles diﬀerences in previous conclu-
sions, and presents persuasive evidence for momentum trading by institutional traders.





<σ b <σ g < 1.
Fund managers do not know their type. Noise trader also buy or sell a unit
independent of v.













t if at =1
pb
t − v if at =0
If a fund manager traded at time t, his actions are observed at time T.
Investors form a posterior belief about the manager￿s type based upon the
managers actions, which we de￿ne to be
￿ γt (at,h t,v)=P r( θt = g|at,h t,v)





t,v,h t)=( 1− β)π(χt)+βr(￿ γt),
where β ∈ (0,1) is a parameter, and the functions π and r measure the
direct payoﬀ and reputational payoﬀ and are increasing and continuous in
the relevant arguments.
We can show that in this setting, in contrast to well-known prior results,
that the market cannot be fully informationally eﬃcient e v e ni nt h el o n gr u n .
We begin with an example to illustrate the intuition behind the main result.
3 The Impossibility of Full Revelation
We ￿rst present an example and then we discuss the general result.
3.1 Example
Let π and r be linear. The manager maximizes βχt +( 1− β)￿ γ
t.
A sincere equilibrium is one in which fund managers play according to
their signals: at = st for all t at which a fund manager is active.
If β =1 , there is a sincere equilibrium (Avery-Zemsky 1998). Suppose
instead that β<1.
7Proposition 1 There is no sincere equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there is a sincere equilibrium. Suppose that at t the
price is pt and the manager plays at = st.L e t
￿ v
t
1 =P r ( v =1 |st =1 ,h t)=








0 =P r ( v =1 |st =0 ,h t)=




(1 − pt)σ + pt (1 − σ)
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t =P r ( noise trader|buy order, ht), is the probability assigned by the
market maker that he faces a noise trader upon receiving a buy order and
observing the history of trades. Similarly, δ
s
t=Pr(noise trader|sell order, ht).














2δ +( 1− δ)[pt(1 − σ)+( 1− pt)σ]
Suppose the current price is pt and the manager in t observes st =0 .I fh e
buys, his expected trading pro￿ti s￿ vt
0−pa
t, while if he sells it is pb
t −￿ vt
0.T h u s
the diﬀerence between the expected pro￿t of buying and selling is







The reputational payoﬀs in a sincere equilibrium are:
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It is a best response to play at =0instead of at =1when st =0when
β∆π +( 1− β)∆r<0.
Let the price rise to one. Notice that as pt → 1, ￿ vt
0 → 1 and ￿ vt
1 → 1,
that is, regardless of whether the manager has received the high or the low
signal, the accumulated information in prices convinces him that the expected




t are bounded, and thus as
pt → 1,i tm u s ta l s ob et r u et h a tpa
t → 1 and pb
t → 1. Now, taking limits we
have
lim







t =2− 1 − 1=0
lim







∆￿ γ =( 2− 1)∆￿ γ>0
Hence, for pt high enough it is a best response for a fund manager with st =0
to play at =1 . Thus the equilibrium cannot be sincere. A contradiction.
3.2 General Result
We now consider the general problem, and illustrate that prices can never
converge to true liquidation value in the presence of reputational concerns.






































































∆r(￿ γ (v,ht)) = r(￿ γ (1,v,h t)) − r(￿ γ (0,v,h t))
We restrict attention to non-perverse equilibria. We say that an equi-
librium is perverse if for some priod t and some history ht which occurs
with positive probability on the equilibrium path, the fund manager at t is
more likely to buy if he has a negative signal than is he has a positive signal
(αt (ht,s t =0 )>α t (ht,s t =1 ) ). Thus, we are not excluding perverse be-
havior oﬀ the equilibrium path. Note that perverse equilibria are extremely
unplausible in a ￿nancial context because perverse behavior given ht im-
plies that the bid price conditional on ht is strictly lower than the ask price
conditional on ht.
Proposition 2 In any non-perverse equilibrium there exists (p,p) ∈ (0,1)2
such that if pt > p or pt <pthen the actions of fund managers from period
t onwards provide no information about their private signals.
The proposition is proven in several steps. We ￿rst show that as the price
approaches either 0 or 1 the expected trading pro￿t goes to zero. Second,
we analyze the reputational incentives in an informative non-perverse equi-
librium. As the price goes to one, the fund manager faces a positive and
non-in￿nitesimal expected reputational bene￿t if he chooses to buy rather
than to sell. Conversely, when the price goes to one, he faces a positive
and non-in￿nitesimal bene￿t if he sells rather than buying. Putting together
the pro￿t motive and the reputational motive, we conclude that if the price
is high enough or low enough there cannot be an informative non-perverse
equilibrium. From then on, the market is stuck in an information cascade.
No additional private information is revealed.
This result bears a connection to Ottaviani and Sorensen [24], who pro-
vide a general analysis of reputational cheap talk and show that full infor-
mation transmission is generically impossible. Of particular interest to the
10present paper is their Proposition 9, where they consider a sequence of ex-
perts providing reports on a common state of the world and they show that
informational herding must occur. As in our model, the experts receive signal
that are uncorrelated with each other (given the state of the world). How-
ever, there are several diﬀerences. On the one hand, Ottaviani and Sorensen
consider a space of signals and states that is more general than our binary
space. On the other hand, we: (a) we show the necessity of informational
cascades (while Ottaviani and Sorense prove that herding must occur but
they cannot exclude that the true value is revealed in the limit); (b) our
experts have a pro￿t motive as well as a reputational motive; and (c) most
important, our model is embedded in a ￿nancial market.
3.3 Proof
We proceed by proving two preliminary results.
Lemma 3 There exists a function f :[ 0 ,1]￿[0,1] → [0,1] such that Pr(v =
1|ht,s t)=f(pt,s t) and f satis￿es the following properties:
(a) f(pt,s t) is strictly increasing and continuous in pt.
(b) f(1,s t)=1=1− f(0,s t)
(c) f(pt,1) >f(pt,0)
Proof.
Pr(v =1 |ht,s t)=
Pr(st,h t|v =1)Pr(v =1 )
Pr(st,h t)
=









Pr(st|v =1 )P r ( ht)
Pr(st,h t)
pt
Pr(st,h t)=P r ( ht)[pt Pr(st|v =1 )+( 1− pt)Pr(st|v =0 ) ]
Thus
Pr(v =1 |ht,s t)=
pt Pr(st|v =1 )
pt Pr(st|v =1 )+( 1− pt)Pr(st|v =0 )
= f(pt,s t)
11Now parts (a) and (b) follow immediately. To see part (c) note that
f(pt,1) =
pt





pt +( 1− pt)1−σ
σ
where σ = γσg +( 1− γ)σb. Similarly
f(pt,0) =
pt
pt +( 1− pt) σ
1−σ
Since σg >σ b > 1
2, σ>1
2.T h u s 1−σ
σ < 1 < σ
1−σ. This then implies
f(pt,1) >f(pt,0) which completes the proof of the lemma.
The mixed strategy of manager t in this market will generally depend on
both this history he observes and his signal. We denote this by αt
st (ht).
A mixed strategy equilibrium is a sequence {αt
st (ht)}
T−1
t=1 . For notational
convenience, we often omit the history argument and we denote the t fund




Consider a set of equilibrium strategies (αt
0,α t
1) ∈ [0,1]
2.W e c a n n o w
compute the posteriors regarding fund managers. The posterior belief is
given by
￿ γ (at,v,h t)=
Pr(at|θ = g,v,ht)γ
Pr(at|θ = g,v,ht)γ +P r( at|θ = b,v,ht)(1− γ)
Note that
Pr(at =1 |θ = g,v =1 ,h t)=α1 (ht)σg + α0 (ht)(1− σg)
and similarly for the other realizations of ￿ γ. Therefore, we can write
￿ γ (at =1 ,v=1 ,h t)=
α1 (ht)σg + α0 (ht)(1− σg)
α1 (ht)σ + α0 (ht)(1− σ)
γ
￿ γ (at =1 ,v=0 ,h t)=
α1 (ht)(1− σg)+α0 (ht)σg
α1 (ht)(1− σ)+α0 (ht)σ
γ
￿ γ (at =0 ,v=1 ,h t)=
(1 − α1 (ht))σg +( 1− α0 (ht))(1 − σg)
(1 − α1 (ht))σ +( 1− α0 (ht))(1 − σ)
γ
￿ γ (at =0 ,v=0 ,h t)=
(1 − α1 (ht))(1 − σg)+( 1− α0 (ht))σg
(1 − α1 (ht))(1 − σ)+( 1− α0 (ht))σ
γ
We now show that in all non-perverse equilibria either the manager with
the high signal or the manager with the low signal play a pure strategy.




Proof. Consider a putative equilibrium in which 1 >α t
0 > 0,i . e . t h e
a g e n ta tt i m et who receives signal zero is exactly indiﬀerent between buying
and selling. We will show that in this equilibrium, it must be the case that
the agent who receives signal 1 at time t must strictly prefer to buy rather












































,a n db yL e m m a3
f (pt,1) >f(pt,0),i ti sc l e a rt h a t
X
v=0,1























Now consider the expected reputational payoﬀ diﬀerence between buying and
selling:
P
v=0,1 Pr(v|ht,s t)∆r(￿ γ (v,ht)). This can be expressed as:
f (pt,s t)[r(￿ γ (1,h t,1))−r(￿ γ (0,h t,1))]+(1 − f (pt,s t))[r(￿ γ (1,h t,0))−r(￿ γ (0,h t,0))]





(1−α1)σ+(1−α0)(1−σ) . Algebraic ma-
nipulation shows that this implies that (σg − σ)(α1 − α0) < 0 which is a
contradiction since σg − σ>0 and α1 − α0 > 0. Similarly it is also true





(1−α1)(1−σ)+(1−α0)σ This implies that
−(σg − σ)(α1 − α0) > 0 which is a contradiction. Thus, r(￿ γ (1,h t,1)) −
r(￿ γ (0,h t,1)) > 0 >r (￿ γ (1,h t,0))−r(￿ γ (0,h t,0)). Given Lemma 3, we know
that f (pt,1) >f(pt,0),a n dt h u s
X
v=0,1
Pr(v|ht,s t =1 )∆r(￿ γ (v,ht)) >
X
v=0,1
Pr(v|ht,s t =0 )∆r(￿ γ (v,ht))
Finally, the arguments above imply that
X
v=0,1
Pr(v|ht,s t = 1)((1 − β)∆π + β∆r) >
X
v=0,1
Pr(v|ht,s t = 0)((1 − β)∆π + β∆r)=0
13Thus, if 0 <α 0(ht) < 1,t h e nα1(ht)=1 . An identical argument establishes




t=1 be any non-perverse perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this
game: α1(ht) >α 0(ht) for all ht.
Lemma 5 For every ε>0 there exists ﬂ p1 (ε) and ﬂ p2 (ε) such that (for all
ht):
∆π ≥− ε for all pt > ﬂ p2 (ε)
and
∆π ≤ ε for all pt < ﬂ p1 (ε)
Proof. With terms de￿ned as above, ￿rst consider the expected direct







































Pr(v|ht,s t)(π(v) − π(−v))
= f(pt,s t)(π(1) − π(−1))




Pr(v|ht,s t)(π(v − 1) − π(1 − v))
=( 1 − f(pt,s t))(π(−1) − π(1))
It is apparent that Uπ > 0. From Lemma 3 we also conclude that Uπ strictly
increasing in pt and limpt→0 Uπ =0 . Similarly, Lπ < 0, strictly decreasing in
pt and limpt→1 Lπ =0 .
This means that for every ε>0 there exists ﬂ p1 (ε) and ﬂ p2 (ε) such that
∆π ≥− ε for all pt > ﬂ p2 (ε)
14and
∆π ≤ ε for all pt < ﬂ p1 (ε)
Second, consider the expected diﬀerence in reputational payoﬀs between
buying and selling. Again, abusing notation, we write:
∆r = f(pt,s t)(v(￿ γ (at =1 ,v=1 ,h t)) − v(￿ γ (at =0 ,v=1 ,h t)))
+(1 − f(pt,s t))(v(￿ γ (at =1 ,v=0 ,h t)) − v(￿ γ (at =0 ,v=0 ,h t)))
Lemma 6 For every number  >0 (but not too large), there exist ￿ p1 (ε) and
￿ p2 (ε) such that (for all ht):
∆r ≥   for all pt > ￿ p2 (ε)
and
∆r ≤−   for all pt < ￿ p1 (ε).
Proof. From Lemma 4 we know that there cannot be an equilibrium in
which 0 <α 0 (ht) <α 1 (ht) < 1. Thus, either 0=α0 (ht) <α 1 (ht) < 1 or
0 <α 0 (ht) <α 1 (ht)=1 .
If 0=α0 (ht) <α 1 (ht) < 1, the diﬀerence









(1 − α1 (ht))σg +( 1− σg)


























σg + α0(ht)(1 − σg)





























































we note that in all non-perverse equilibria, the diﬀerence
r(￿ γ (at =1 ,v=1 ,h t)) − r(￿ γ (at =0 ,v=1 ,h t))
is bounded below by L1
r and bounded above by U1
r. Now consider the case
where v =0 .I f 0=α0 (ht) <α 1 (ht) < 1, the diﬀerence










(1 − α1 (ht))σg + σg
(1 − α1 (ht))σ + σ
γ
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(1 − σg)+α0 (ht)σg




























































16we note that in all non-perverse equilibria, the diﬀerence
r(￿ γ (at =1 ,v=0 ,h t)) − r(￿ γ (at =0 ,v=0 ,h t))
is bounded below by L0
r and bounded above by U0
r.
Thus ∆r is bounded above by
f(pt,s t)U
1
r +( 1− f(pt,s t))U
0
r
and bounded below by
f(pt,s t)L
1
r +( 1− f(pt,s t))L
0
r
F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a tU1
r = −L0
r > 0 and L1
r = −U0
r > 0.T h u s , ∆r is
bounded above by
Ur = f(pt,s t)U
1
r − (1 − f(pt,s t))L
1
r
and bounded below by
Lr = f(pt,s t)L
1
r − (1 − f(pt,s t))U
1
r
Now, utilizing Lemma 1 above, we know that Ur strictly increasing in pt and
limpt→0 Ur = −L1
r < 0. Similarly, Lr < 0, strictly decreasing in pt and
limpt→1 Lr = L1
r > 0.
Thus, for every number 0 < <L 1
r there exists a price e p2( ) < 1 such
that for pt > e p2( ), ∆r ≥  .
The part of the proof concerning e p1( ) is analogous and it is omitted.
But by appeal to the arguments above, for a given positive number
β
1−β( −
δ) (where δ ∈ (0, ))t h e r ee x i s t sp2(
β
1−β( −δ)) < 1 such that if pt > p2(
β
1−β( −
δ)) , then ∆π ≥−
β
1−β( −δ) > −
β











+ β  =0
Thus, for any price greater than e p2( ) the fund manager would always choose
to buy. The case for selling is symmetric.
174 Price Dynamics: An Example
We have demonstrated a general impossibility result ￿ there exists no equilib-
rium in which prices converge to fundamentals. A natural question is: What
equilibria exist, and what are the dynamics of prices in such equilibria. We
provide an example of such an equilibrium. Assume that γ = 1
2, σb = 1
2,
σg =1 , β = 1
2,a n dδ =0 .
Proposition 7 There is an equilibrium in which fund managers play sin-
cerely as long as pt ∈ [ﬂ p,1 − ﬂ p]. I fa ts o m et trade occurs at pt < ﬂ p (pt >
1 − ﬂ p), all fund managers after t sell (buy) and the price stays at pt.T h e








3 − 2pt − 2(1− 2pt)at
.
Proof. We then have that the conditional expectation of v becomes
￿ v
t










and the reputational bene￿t of making the right trade rather than the wrong













From the analysis above, we know that a fund manager who observes st =1
prefers to buy rather then sell (in a sincere equilibrium) if
β





















∆￿ γ ≥ 0.

















which holds if and only if








18This can also be seen graphically, if one graphs ∆π (dotted plot) and -∆r
(continuous plot):










It remains for us to check that for pt < ﬂ p it is actually optimal for the fund
manager who observes st =1to sell instead of buy. This needs to be checked
separately, since for pt < ﬂ p equilibrium behaviour is not contingent on signals,
and thus reputational payoﬀs (as well as direct pro￿ts) are diﬀerent than in
the sincere part of the equilibrium. Note that if the manager who has
observed the high signal chooses to sell, so will the manager who observes
the low signal.
In the region where equilibrum strategies require all managers to sell, the
reputational payoﬀ to selling is simply γ. Buying, on the other hand, is
an oﬀ-equilibrium event. Let us assume that such an event generates the
following oﬀ-equilibrium belief: the manager who chooses to buy is assumed
to do so sincerely, i.e., is assumed to have observed signal st =1 .T h u s , t h e
reputational payoﬀ from buying is vt
1
σg
σ γ − (1 − vt
1)
1−σg
1−σ γ.T h u s
∆r = v
t




Now consider direct pro￿ts. Since all managers sell in equilibrium, the
market maker oﬀers a bid price of simply pt.T h u s p r o ￿ts from selling are
pt − vt
1. However, upon seeing a buy order, in the absence of noise traders,
the market maker assumes (according to the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs assumed
above) that the order is from a fund-manager with signal st =1 .a n dt h u s
the ask price is set to vt
1.T h u s , p r o ￿ts from buying are vt
1 − vt
1 =0 .W e
conclude that





19Thus, the fund manager will prefer to sell rather than buy if and only if
v
t






which in this example reduces to
3pt
1+2 pt








which holds if and only if pt < 0.191.S i n c e p<0.191, whenever pt < p,i t
must be true that pt < 0.191. It is thus optimal for the manager to behave
sincerely for p ≥ p and sell if p<p.
A similar argument can be developed for a fund manager who observes
st. She is willing to play sincerely only as long as pt ≤ 1 − ﬂ p.










3−2pt if at =0
Hence, we can write
pt+1 =
pt +2 atpt
3 − 2pt − 2(1− 2pt)at
.
When pt > 1 − ﬂ p, the fund manager always buys, irrespective of his private
signal. When pt < ﬂ p, the fund manager always sells.
5 Prices and Reputational Bene￿ts
From the viewpoint of fund managers, the expected total value of the asset
can diﬀer from expected liquidation value. The diﬀerence captures the ex-
pected reputational bene￿to rc o s tthat the fund manager incurs if he buys
or sells the asset.
Let wt
st be the price at which a fund manager in t who observes signal st
is exactly indiﬀerent between buying and selling. We refer to wt
st as the fund

























t(at =0 ,v,p t
¢
).
20If the fund manager has no career concerns (β =1 ), we simply have that
wt
st =￿ vt
st: the expected total value is just the expected liquidation value.




















t (at =0 ,v,p t)
¢¢
.
We refer to ρt
st as the reputational bene￿t or cost of the asset for the manager
in t if he observes st. We now characterize the dynamics of the reputational
bene￿t in a large class of reasonable equilibria. De￿ne piecewise-stationary
non-perverse equilibria as follows:
De￿nition 8 A piecewise-stationary non-perverse equilibrium is a non-perverse
equilibrium in which
∂αst(pt)
∂pt =0except for a ￿nite number of prices pt ∈ Γ.
Note that all pure strategy equilibria and the truncated sincere equilib-
rium identi￿ed above fall within this class of equilibria.
Proposition 9 In any piecewise-stationary non-perverse equilibrium, the
reputational bene￿t ρt
st is strictly increasing in the asset price pt,except pos-
sibly at a ￿nite set of points.
Proof. Consider any piecewise-stationary non-perverse equilibrium, and
suppose that pt / ∈ Γ.F o r s u c h pt, there exists a small interval (pt − ,pt + )
such that for all b pt ∈ (pt −  ,pt +  ), αst(b pt)=αst(pt),b yd e ￿nition of
piecewise-stationarity. Thus, when considering derivatives evaluated at pt,w e
can suppress the history dependence of the strategy, and write αst(pt)=αst.
In addition, note that we have already shown that there are no totally mixed
non-perverse equilibria. Thus, we can restrict attention to either α1 =1and
α0 ∈ (0,1),o rα1 ∈ (0,1) and α0 =0 . We demonstrate the result for the
￿rst case. The second is symmetric.
Using an earlier characterization of posteriors in all non perverse equilib-
ria, it is easy to see that when α1 =1and α0 ∈ (0,1), E
¡
￿ γ








σg + α0(1 − σg)











where K proxies for terms not involving pt. We have shown earlier that vt
st
is an increasing function of pt for all pt and st. Thus, all that remains to be
21shown is that the multiplier of vt









(1−σ)+α0σ , which is only true if and
only if
[σg + α0(1 − σg)][(1 − σ)+α0σ] ≥ [(1 − σg)+α0σg][σ + α0(1 − σ)]
but
(σg + α0(1 − σg))((1 − σ)+α0σ) − ((1 − σg)+α0σg)(σ + α0(1 − σ))
=( 1 − α
2




















t (at =0 ,v,p t)
¢¢
is always increasing in pt, except possibly for pt ∈ Γ.
There is a systematice diﬀerence between the valuation of the asset for
traders with career concerns and regular traders. The diﬀerence is increasing
in the price, except possibly at a countable number of points. In general,
therefore, the higher the price of an asset, the greater is the reputational
surplus from purchasing it. We shall see below that if the market making
sector has market power, and thus can extract at least part of this surplus
from career concerned managers, trade can sometimes occur at seemingly
irrational prices.
6 Reputational Bene￿ts and Asset Price Bub-
bles
So far, we have made an extreme assumption: during any transaction career-
driven traders have all the bargaining power. This is a consequence of includ-
ing a competitive market making sector. While this is a standard modeling
choice, it has extreme consequences in the present setting.
In this model, there are two types of traders, the ones with career concerns
and the ones without. As we have argued already, there exists a wedge
between the valuations of these two classes of investors. However, because of
the ￿fair pricing￿ consequence of competitive market making, the price only
re￿ects the valuation of traders without career concerns. This is clearly an
22extreme position. In reality, we should expect that the bargaining power is
shared and that therefore the price re￿ects the valuations of both classes of
investors.
While it would be desirable to model bargaining power as shared, such
s e t t i n gw o u l di n v o l v eah i g hd e g r e eo fa nalytical complexity. In this section
we limit ourselves to study the other extreme case, when all the bargaining
power is on the side of traders without career concerns. This is suﬃcient to
have an idea of what happens to equilibrium dynamics when the reputational
bene￿t is factored into asset price.
We employ a simple way to generate limited supply of the asset. We
assume that in every period t the fund manager faces one short-lived mo-
nopolistic trader who has an asset to sell and no buyers (perhaps because no
one is willing to let her go short). The monopolistic seller operates only in
period t. If he does not sell the asset at t, he will keep it until T when he
will receive the liquidation value v. The monopolistic seller does not know
the liquidation value, and infers it from the market by observing past order
￿ow and also from the current period order ￿ow.
We face a further modeling choice. If there are noise traders who submit
market orders, a monopolistic seller can set an ini￿nitely high price and make
in￿nite pro￿ts. We could assume that noise traders submit limit orders (with
s t o c h a s t i cl i m i t s ) ,b u tw ec h o o s et os i m p l i f yt h ea n a l y s i sb ya s s u m i n gt h a t
there are no noise traders. The results can be taken as the limit of a model in
which there is a vanishing probability of a noise trader who submits a limit
order.
The analysis is carried out within the example used previously: γ = 1
2,
σb = 1
2, σg =1 , β = 1
2,a n dδ =0 .
Proposition 10 There exists an equilibrium in which:
(i) A fund manager with st =0never buys;
(ii) A fund manager with st =1buys if and only if the expected liquidation
value is above a certain threshold (￿ vt > 1
4);
(iii) Trades occur at a price higher than the expected liquidation value;
(iv) Trades can occur at price higher than 1 (for instance, when the market
opens at t =1the seller quotes a price of 13
12 a n dm a k e sas a l ew i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
1
2);
(v) The price can go up to 3
2;
(vi) An information cascade occurs only if the expected liquidation value
goes below the threshold (￿ vt < 1
4).
23Proof. Suppose we are in the equilibrium outlined above. A fund man-
































































∆￿ γ ≥ 0.

























































17b vt − 2




















11b vt − 6
3(3− 2b vt)
Plot the two ask prices









Expected liquidation value of v









Value of asset to fund manager
24W en e e dt oc h e c kt h a tt h em a r k e tm a k e rc a n n o tm a k em o r em o n e yb y
decreasing the sale price ￿ vt to a level at which the fund manager would buy
even if st =0 . Suppose that the fund manager buys even if st =0 .T h e












The action at =0is out of equilibrium and we assume as before that the
market believes that it is associated with a fund manager who has observed



















The reputational bene￿t for a fund manager with st =1who chooses at =1




















































































8b vt − 1
2(2b vt +1 )
.




















3 − 2b vt +
b vt
3 − 2b vt
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16b vt − 9
6(3− 2b vt)









Value of asset to fund manager
We now check which sales strategy is optimal for the seller. In the sincere
equilibrium the seller will wish to sell if and only if
17b vt − 2




b e c a u s ei fh ei sa b l et om a k eas a l et h i sr e v e a l st h a th ei sf a c i n gaf u n d
manager with signal st =1 , and he is able to charge him a price of 17b vt−2
3(2b vt+1).
This holds when b vt > 0.25.
Instead if the seller sold at a price low enough to induce managers with
either signal to buy from him, then he would be able to charge only 16b vt−9
6(3−2b vt)
and upon ￿nding a buyer (with probability 1) would value the asset at b vt
(since the current period order ￿ow conveys no information to him). Thus
he would wish to sell if and only if




which holds when b vt > 0.95336.
T h es t r a t e g i e st h u sp r o d u c et h es a m ep a y o ﬀsf o rb vt ≤ 0.25 but potentially
diﬀerent payoﬀs everywhere else. Consider the region b vt ∈ [0.25,0.95336].
In this region, the strategy of excluding the low signal fund managers leads
t oap a y o ﬀ of
1
2
17b vt − 2





3 − 2￿ vt
since a sale is made with probability 1
2 and if a sale is not made then the seller
knows the manager facing him has received signal st =0and thus the asset
he is forced to keep is worth only b vt
0 = ￿ vt
3−2￿ vt to him. On the other hand, the
26strategy of not selling leads to a payoﬀ of ￿ vt.F o r b vt ∈ [0.25,0.95336],i ti s
easy to see that
1
2
17b vt − 2





3 − 2￿ vt > b v
t
Finally, then, it remains to check that in the region b vt ∈ (0.95336,1] it is
better to exclude the fund managers with st =0 .T h e p a y o ﬀ from the




17b vt − 2





3 − 2￿ vt
as before. On the other hand, the payoﬀ from the strategy of including all
fund managers is
16b vt − 9
6(3− 2b vt)
since he makes a sale with probability one. Now we note that
1
2
17b vt − 2





3 − 2￿ vt >
16b vt − 9
6(3− 2b vt)
in the region b vt ∈ (0.95336,1]. Thus, the monopolistic seller retains the asset
for b vt ≤ 0.25 and the market ceases to function, and sells at the proposed
























What happens if the fund managers know, at least partially, their type?
Suppose that the fund manager receives two signals: the now familiar st
and a new signal zt,w i t hPr(zt = θ|θ)=ρ.
Proposition 11 If self-knowledge is not too accurate, there exists no equi-
librium in which a fund manager with zt =1plays sincerely.
27Proof. Suppose there exists a non-perverse equilibrium in which a fund
manager who observes zt = g always plays at = st.
Consider a fund manager with zt =1and st =0and suppose that the
current price is pt.L e t
￿ v
st,zt
t = E [v|st,z t,h t].




t =1 for all st,z t.
Hence, the expected bene￿t in terms of trading pro￿to fp l a y i n gat =0




The expected reputation bene￿t/cost of playing at =0instead at =1for a
fund manager with zt = g and st =0is
∆r =￿ v
0,g
t ((￿ γt (at =0 ,v=1 )− ￿ γt (at =1 ,v= 1)))
+
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In a non-perverse equilibrium in which a fund manager with zt = g plays
at = st,a spt → 1, beliefs have the following bounds (based on the assumption

























































(1 − σg)ργ +( 1− σb)(1− ρ)(1− γ)
.
Inequality (1) is satis￿ed only if
(1 − σg)ργ
(1 − σg)ργ +( 1− σb)(1− ρ)(1− γ)
≥
(1 − ρ)γ
(1 − ρ)γ + ρ(1 − γ)
.
If ρ → 1
2, the inequality reduces to
(1 − σg)γ




Suppose that the reputational component of the fund manager￿s payoﬀ de-
pends on her relative reputation. The payoﬀ is now
(1 − β)π(χt)+βrt (￿ γ1,..., ￿ γT).
We assume that r is still continuous and diﬀerentiable in its components and






≤ 0 for τ 6= t.
This formulation encompasses a situation in which the reputational payoﬀ
is an increasing (and perhaps convex) function of the diﬀerence between
the reputation of a particular manager and the average reputation of all
managers:








Proposition 12 There is no sincere equilibrium.
29Proof. Suppose a sincere equilibrium exists and consider the fund man-
ager in the last period, T.A st h ea g e n t ￿ sa c t i o nd o e sn o ta ﬀect the reputa-
tions of all othere agents, the analysis is identical to the case without relative
performance. The proof of nonexistence for pT → {0,1} follows familiar lines.
7.3 Informed Individual Traders
To date, we have restricted attention to a market in which uninformed market
makers are faced with either noise traders or reputationally sensitive traders.
A natural added member of the marketplace would be informed individual
investors, who do not face career concerns. How would the results change if
informed individual investors operated in our baseline model?
It is clear that informed inviduals devoid of career concerns would trade
sincerely, and thus, in the presence of such traders prices would eventually
converge to true value. However, the basic intuition of the main result in
unchanged in this case: once prices were close enough to true value, career
concerned institutional traders would begin to ignore their own information.
Thus convergence to true value would take place much more slowly than in
the case without fund managers, and the extent of slowdown in convergence
would depend on the proportion of career concerned traders in the market.
In addition, conformist trading by institutional traders would still occur in
the presence of informed individual traders. Thus, our model would still
predict information cascades by institutional traders, in keeping with the
empirical literature on herding and momentum trading by institutions (for
example, Sias [28] and [29]).
8C o n c l u s i o n
The central message of this paper is that the presence of (even small amounts
of) reputational concerns will prevent institutional traders from trading sin-
cerely when prices become close enough to liquidation value. Such a tendency
to neglect valuable private information is an endogenous (and pervasive) ob-
stacle to the convergence of prices to liquidation values in the long run, and
can be the basis of herd-like behaviour by institutional traders, along the
lines already documented in the empirical literature.
Further, we have argued that the presence of reputational incentives can
30drive a wedge between the expected liquidation value of an asset and its total
value to fund managers. We have presented an example of how such repu-
tational premia can be incorporated into prices, thus leading to asset price
bubbles. While we have carefully related our central results on conformist
trading to existing theoretical explanations in the introduction, it remains for
us to do the same for our explorations on asset price bubbles. In conclusion,
therefore, we brie￿y relate our example of asset price bubbles to the existing
theoretical literature on bubbles in ￿nancial markets.
While the classical no-trade arguments of Milgrom and Stokey [21] and
Tirole [31] preclude bubbles in markets with asymmetric information and
rational agents in general, a number of papers construct examples of bubbles
while examining the role of higher order beliefs in asset pricing. Allen, Mor-
ris, and Postlewaite [5] build on the no-trade theorems to develop necessary
conditions for the existence of bubbles, and provide examples of economies
in which bubbles can exist. Morris, Postlewaite, and Shin [22] illustrate
the connection between bubbles and higher order uncertainty. Prices are
biased statistics of true value in the recent work of Allen, Morris, and Shin
[6]. There are also a large number of papers in which bubbles arise and
persist because some traders are irrational (e.g. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldmann [16], Shleifer and Vishny [27], Abreu and Brunnermeier [1],
and Scheinkman and Xiong [26], amongst others).
More closely related to our work, a few papers construct examples of bub-
bles based on agency con￿icts. Most notably, Allen and Gorton [4] develop
a model in which prices can diverge from fundamentals due to churning by
portfolio managers. In their model, bad fund managers buy bubble stocks
at prices above their known liquidation value in the hope of reselling them
before they die ￿ at even higher prices ￿ to other bad fund managers.
Their behavior is the result of an option-like payoﬀ structure under which
pro￿ts are shared with managers but losses are not. Churning thus creates
the possibility of short-term speculative pro￿ts. A related principal-agent
con￿ict leads to bubbles in Allen and Gale [3]. In contrast to both of these
papers, in our example, bubbles arise without option-like payoﬀs purely due
to reputational concerns of ￿nancial traders.
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